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Abstract. By means of a laboratory experiment, we study the impact of the 
endogenous adoption of a collective punishment mechanism within a one-shot binary 
trust game. The experiment comprises three games. In the first one, the only 
equilibrium strategy is not to trust, and not to reciprocate. In the second we 
exogenously introduce a sanctioning rule that imposes on untrustworthy 
second-movers a penalty proportional to the number of those who reciprocate trust. 
This generates a second equilibrium where everybody trusts and reciprocates. In the 
third game, the collective punishment mechanism is adopted through majority-voting. 
In line with the theory, we find that the exogenous introduction of the punishment 
mechanism significantly increases trustworthiness, and to a lesser extent also trust. 
However, in the third game the majority of subjects vote against it: subjects seem to 
be unable to endogenously adopt an institution which, when exogenously imposed, 
proves to be efficiency enhancing. 
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1. Introduction 
At least since Aristotle’s time, there has been a general consensus among legal 
scholars that the law defined as an obligation backed by powerful state coercion can 
create and maintain social order, such as enforcing property rights, adjudicating 
disputes, and providing an efficient level of public goods through adequately 
collecting a variety of taxes. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown that a 
well-functioning and impartial legal system largely enhances societal trust, thereby 
promoting trade and economic development (Algan and Cahuc, 2013; Guiso, et al., 
2008; Tabellini, 2008). Particularly in a standard contractual relationship, better 
enforcement, it is typically assumed, can increase the likelihood of contract 
performance by increasing the probability of the sanction and the cost of breach, 
naturally stimulating all manner of reliance investments that have specific value in the 
contractual relationship (Polinsky and Shavell, 2008).1 Nearly half of the world’s 
governments, however, fail to provide a sufficiently strong system of contract 
enforcement (Leeson and Williamson, 2009), and even abuse their authority to engage 
in profit-seeking punishment, which is detrimental to the country’s economic 
performance (Xiao, 2013). Therefore, it becomes of paramount importance to 
understand how people who lack the protection of an effective legal environment can 
establish private-order institutions (or norms) to facilitate mutually advantageous 
exchanges.  
In his influential anthropological field study on the cattle-control norms in rural 
Shasta County, California, Ellickson (1986, 1991) shows that social norms may work 
as effective mechanisms of social control. He argues that, when the social fabric is 
sufficiently dense and connected, social norms might supersede the legal rules, even if 
transaction costs are high – or precisely for that reason, as it is argued. Social norms 
have long been recognized as having great influence on individual behavior in social 
sciences, such as economics (Elster, 1989), sociology (Hechter and Opp, 2001), social 
psychology (Cialdini, et al., 1990; Schultz et al., 2007) and legal studies (Posner, 
1997; Posner and Rasmusen, 1999). Nonetheless, the definition of a social norm is 
still controversial. One can consider two different meanings of the concept of social 
norm: descriptive norm, and injunctive norm (Cialdini, et al., 2006). The former is 
often adopted by social scientists, and refers to what most people do, to the commonly 
observed behavior, in contrast to what deviants do. The latter, commonly adopted by 
philosophers, refers to what one ought to do in order to gain social approval and to be 
rewarded, or to avoid censure and informal punishment (Cooter, 1998).2 While 
Cooter (1998) places more emphasis on the second type of concept, Bicchieri’s (2006) 
                                                        
1 Introducing a third-party intervention into an investment game, Charness et al. (2008) experimentally 
reveal that the incentives (i.e. sanctions or rewards) implemented by an independent third-party 
significantly increase trust and trustworthiness in the investment game.	  
2 Krupka and Weber (2013) empirically show that differences in injunctive norms – which they elicit 
by means of a novel approach based on incentivized coordination games – may explain the observed 
behavioral differences that emerge across several previous experimental dictator games. 
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formal definition of “social norm” encompasses both aspects, by stating that a 
behavioral rule is a social norm if (i) people are aware of rule existing and know that 
it applies to the situation under analysis (contingency condition), (ii) they expect that 
the others will conform to the rule (empirical expectations condition), and (iii) they 
believe others to think that people ought to obey the rule (normative expectations 
condition). It will soon become clear that the second condition is the one playing the 
most crucial role in our study. 
Anderlini and Terlizzese (2013) theoretically study the introduction of a social 
norm into a standard contractual relationship, by letting the promisor’s behavior be 
constrained by the average behavior of other promisors in a society. More specifically, 
in their model they represent a bilateral contractual relationship in the absence of 
contract enforcement as a one-shot binary trust game. Think for instance of an 
investor and an agent, strangers to each other. The investor lends some money to the 
agent, who makes an investment, and this investment generates a surplus proportional 
to the invested sum. The agent then decides whether to cheat and keep the entire 
surplus, or to share it with the investor. Cheating entails a cost, characterized by two 
components: one component is idiosyncratic and depends on the exogenously given 
“type” of the agent, while the second component is socially determined and common 
to all agents, and depends on the total number of transactions in a society that go 
through without cheating.3 Hence, the stronger the norm of trustworthiness in a 
society, the higher the cost of cheating for the agents. Anderlini and Terlizzese (2013) 
note that the norm-driven component of the cheating cost can be interpreted as 
reflecting psychological remorse when the agent’s action deviates from average 
behavior (Huang and Wu, 1994), or as resulting from a collective punishment 
mechanism, whose effectiveness depends on average behavior. Our experimental 
design adopts the second perspective, potentially inflicting a sanction on the dishonest 
agents. The introduction of this norm-driven component of the cost of cheating 
transforms the trust game into a coordination game with high-trust and low-trust 
equilibria, which are Pareto-ranked. 
Existing experimental evidence indicates that norms of trustworthiness may differ 
across societies (Buchan et al., 2002), and such a difference might affect individual 
behavior, inducing the emergence of one or other of the equilibria. The issue of how 
social norms emerge in societies, however, remains largely unexplored. Anderlini and 
Terlizzese (2013) assume that the “social sensitivity” to the norm-driven component 
of the cheating cost is exogenously given. In this study we take a further step, and 
investigate the effects of the endogenous adoption of a collective punishment 
mechanism whose intensity is proportional to the strength of the norm of 
trustworthiness in society. More specifically, we investigate whether the adoption of 
such mechanism through majority voting can help a society in coordinating on an 
                                                        
3 Previous experimental studies have revealed that individuals involved in social dilemmas are 
heterogeneous in terms of social preferences (Blanco et al., 2011). Anderlini and Terlizzese (2013) 
assume that there are two types of agents, high-type and low-type agents, who differ in their preference 
for honesty and the magnitude of the psychological cost they suffer when abusing their partner’s trust. 
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efficient equilibrium, characterized by high levels of trust and trustworthiness.4 
Starting from a simplified version of Anderlini and Terlizzese’s model, we 
theoretically show that most subjects, regardless of their preferences and expectations, 
vote in favor of the punishment mechanism, hence this mechanism will be 
endogenously introduced. As a consequence, a majority vote in favor of collective 
punishment cannot be interpreted as a signal of subjects’ intentions, and it should not 
matter whether collective punishment is exogenously imposed or endogenously 
adopted. This theoretical prediction contrasts with the findings of recent experimental 
studies, which revealed that the endogenous adoption of institutions induces higher 
cooperation levels in social dilemma situations, relative to the case in which the same 
institutions are exogenously implemented; scholars refer to this phenomenon as “the 
dividend of democracy” (Dal Bo et al., 2010; Markussen et al., 2014; Sutter et al., 
2010; Tyran and Feld, 2006).5 
The theoretical model informs our empirical analysis, which is based on a 
laboratory experiment. In our experiment, each subject plays three one-shot games 
with three different partners. The first game is a standard binary trust game. In the 
second game, a collective punishment mechanism is exogenously introduced, under 
which cheating is sanctioned with a severity that depends on the trustworthiness of the 
others. In the third part of the experiment they have to choose whether to play 
according to the rules of the first, or of the second game, by means of a majority 
voting mechanism. To reduce the risk of spillover effects, the outcomes of these three 
games are not revealed to the subjects until the end of the session. In half of the 
sessions the sequence of the first and the second game is reversed, to control for 
possible order effects. This design allows us to test whether subjects are willing to opt 
for having a collective punishment mechanism in place, and to study how the 
endogenous adoption of such mechanism affects individual beliefs and behavior.  
We report four main findings. First, in line with the model, we find that the 
introduction of collective punishment induces a significant increase in the levels of 
trustworthiness, and to a lesser extent also of trust. Second, the endogenous 
introduction of the punishment mechanism by means of a majority-voting rule does 
not significantly change behavior, with respect to what is observed when the 
mechanism is exogenously imposed. Third, in contrast with our theoretical 
predictions, not all subjects seem to be able to anticipate the change in behavior 
induced by the introduction of collective punishment, and a majority of them vote 
against it. We also find that subjects with higher cognitive abilities and with a 
                                                        
4 In real world, we rarely observe that the norm is established through a voting mechanism. However, 
people in a community could publicly express their attitudes towards a specific norm (Kadens and 
Young, 2013). Therefore, we use the voting mechanism as a simple way to capture the essential 
dimension of the public expression of the norm. 
5 Vollan et al. (2013) replicate Tyran and Feld’s (2006) study using a sample of Chinese people. They 
observe that the cooperation rate is higher under an exogenously imposed institution than under a 
democratically selected rule. Their analyses show that this result is mainly driven by the fact that the 
Chinese culture attributes a high importance to obeying authorities. 
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background in statistics are more likely to vote in favor of the punishment mechanism. 
Finally, in an additional treatment, we provide information about the aggregate 
behavior with and without collective punishment; we find that on average this 
additional information does not increase the likelihood of the mechanism being 
adopted.  
The paper has the following structure: Section 2 discusses how our work relates to 
the existing literature. Section 3 presents our theoretical model and testable 
predictions, and describes the experimental design and procedures; Section 4 
illustrates the main results of the experiments; Section 5 concludes. 
2. Related Literature 
Our paper builds upon a considerable number of studies on the effects of informal 
institutional arrangements on individual behavior in social dilemma situations, in the 
absence of a powerful state (Ostrom, 1990). A variety of decentralized governance 
institutions have emerged in remarkably diverse environments (Bernstein, 1992, 2001; 
Greif, 2006). 
In early trade, Greif (1989, 1993) portrays a well-defined and cohesive group 
based on Jewish religion and family origins in the Maghreb, the “Maghribi traders” 
who engage in long-distance, large-scale trading across the whole Muslim 
Mediterranean. Lacking effective legal institutions, these merchants rely on informal 
sanctions based on collective relationships within an exclusive coalition. Members of 
the Maghribi traders’ coalition always recruit agents from their own coalition, convey 
information about their agent’s misbehavior swiftly to other members, and 
collectively ostracize agents who abused their principal’s trust, thereby successfully 
resolving the problem of commitment in one-shot bilateral contractual relationships, 
even in the absence of binding contracts. Similar social sanction institutions also 
proved to work well in Mexican California before the time of the gold rush in 
1848-1949 (Clay, 1997; Clay and Wright, 2005) and in the practice of group lending 
in the developing countries (Besley and Coate, 1995). 
These anthropological studies on informal sanctioning institutions emphasize the 
role of information-sharing among the investors in regulating the agents’ behavior.6 
By contrast, our research adopts an alternative approach: in our set-up, in order to 
gain the investors’ trust, agents are allowed to adopt a collective punishment 
mechanism whose severity depends on the average behavior of all agents’ in the 
society. Therefore, the effectiveness of our mechanism relies on the agents’ and the 
investors’ beliefs, rather than on information-sharing. 
                                                        
6 In Kimbrough and Rubin (2015), subjects play the trust game under a highly anonymous set-up, 
where the investors only know the group identity of their agents. When the investors are allowed to 
share their transaction experience with other investors, the groups with high percentages of dishonest 
agents are collectively boycotted, which secures the high efficiency of the market.    
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Secondly, our paper is also related to the literature on expressive law (Cooter, 1998; 
McAdams, 2000a, 2000b; Posner, 1998, 2000). The classic “law and economics” 
approach focuses on deterrence: a law enforced by a sanction increases the expected 
costs of the illegal activity and thereby induces compliance (Becker, 1968; Polinsky 
and Shavell, 2000). Despite its success in many cases, this view can hardly explain 
why most people obey legal rules even in a situation where they could improve their 
material payoffs if they violate an obligation (Tyler, 1990). 
The expressive law theories provide several possible explanations. One potential 
reason is that the legitimate rules may influence individual preferences by letting 
people realize which behavior is legally prohibited. Another possible reason is that 
even though legal rules are mild, they may act as coordination devices that help 
people predict what others will do. Announcing an expressive legal rule that does not 
change the equilibrium is a form of “cheap talk”. Despite being “cheap”, some forms 
of talk, especially announced by a powerful authority or determined by a majority 
voting mechanism, have been found to actually coordinate individuals’ behavior in 
social dilemma situations.7 
These theories have increasingly gained momentum among theoretical scholars. 
However, only a handful of experimental studies have examined how mild rules 
actually influence individual behavior (Bohnet and Cooter, 2003; Galbiati and 
Vertova, 2008; McAdams and Nadler, 2005; Tyran and Feld, 2006). Our experimental 
study contributes to this literature in two aspects. First, the social sanction in our 
experiment is not always a deterrent but works only if the majority behaves honestly. 
Therefore, the socially shared beliefs are crucial to affect individual behavior. Second, 
instead of a powerful authority announcing the rule, the rule in our paper is 
determined by a voting mechanism, which enhances the legitimacy of the rule and 
may influence individual behavior through changing people’s preferences or 
coordinating their beliefs. Our study is also related to the experimental literature on 
the trust game with punishment (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; de Quervain et al., 2004; 
Vollan, 2011), however, it departs substantially from that strand of literature, in that 
the activation and size of the punishment in our case depends on the behavior of the 
society as a whole, and not on the individual decision of a trustor, who may sanction 
an untrustworthy trustee.  
A closer relation emerges between our work and the literature concerning the 
endogenous adoption of institutions. Recent experimental studies have revealed that 
an institution established endogenously (e.g. through a voting mechanism) can induce 
higher cooperation levels in social dilemma situations, compared to the same 
                                                        
7 In Kamei (2014), subjects are more likely to contribute to cooperation in the public good game when 
a mild sanction rule is collectively selected even without altering the equilibrium of full free riding. 
Unexpectedly, the author also finds that the positive effect of endogenous selection of the institution 
does not disappear even when subjects enter into an exogenous setting with an identical institution. 
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institution implemented exogenously on an otherwise identical group (Dal Bo et al., 
2010; Markussen et al., 2014; Sutter et al., 2010; Tyran and Feld, 2006).  
Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to endogenous institution formation. 
Under the first approach, groups are fixed, and members of each group are asked to 
vote for a specific scheme or to choose one from a broad menu of schemes (Kosfeld 
et al., 2009; Sutter et al., 2010). Previous experimental results indicate that the 
endogenous adoption of informal sanctioning (Tyran and Feld, 2006; Ertan et al., 
2009) or rewarding (Sutter et al., 2010) institutions largely enhances the levels of 
cooperation, relative to the case in which the same institutions are imposed 
exogenously. In addition, subjects tend to converge on the most efficient institutions 
as they gain experience over a course of multiple votes (Putterman et al., 2011).  
The second approach is the “voting by feet” mechanism in open communities 
(Gurerk et al., 2006, 2014; Fehr and Williams, 2013) where subjects can choose 
between different institutions and endogenously form groups with other members 
who also select the same institution. They find that prosocial individuals adopting 
efficient punishment institutions under endogenous selection quickly establish a 
cooperative culture. These institutions increasingly attract other types of subjects to 
migrate to these more cooperative groups and to comply with the prevailing norms. 
Therefore, endogenously chosen institutions induce the whole group to coordinate on 
high cooperation levels, so that in practice there is little or no need to recur to 
punishment. 
Most experimental papers on endogenous formation of institutions are based on the 
framework of public good games, except Dal Bo et al. (2010) who use a prisoner’s 
dilemma game. To the best of our knowledge, no existing empirical research 
addresses the effect of endogenous adoption of social sanction mechanisms on 
individual behavior in the trust game. Compared to the previous studies, our peculiar 
design, i.e. within-subject design without feedback across games, allows us to identify 
the important role of ex-ante beliefs of subjects in equilibrium selection. Furthermore, 
since subjects are exposed to the trust game with and without the collective 
punishment mechanism before voting for the preferred rule governing their 
interactions, we can investigate how different experiences of the effects of collective 
punishment affect individual’s voting behavior. Finally, in line with what argued by 
Markussen et al. (2014), that “the dividend of democracy” is driven by the signaling 
function of voting which promotes coordination on high-contribution outcomes, our 
design also allows us to test whether the endogenous adoption of the punishment 
mechanism could be taken as signal of the general willingness to coordinate on a high 
trust and high trustworthiness equilibrium. 
3. Materials and Methods 
In this section, we first present the theoretical model that informs our experimental 
design, and derive the predictions, which will be empirically tested in Section 4. Then 
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we describe the experimental design and procedures.  
3.1 Theoretical model 
As a baseline situation, we consider the binary investment (or trust) game depicted 
in Figure 1. Each player is initially given an endowment x > 0. The first mover 
decides whether to trust the second mover or not. If she chooses not to trust her 
partner, both of them keep their endowments and leave the transaction. If instead she 
chooses to trust and transfers her endowment, the second mover efficiently invests the 
money he received, together with his own endowment, to generate a total of 2x+ 2s, 
with s > 0. The second mover now has to choose whether to cheat on the first mover, 
and keep the entire amount leaving the first mover with nothing, or to split it equally 
with her, so that each party gets x+ s. We further assume that, in the society, all 
players face equal chances of playing the game in the role of the first or second 
mover. 
Following the Anderlini and Terlizzese’s (2013) approach, we assume that there 
are two types of players in the society, “high” (H) and “low” (L).  H-type players 
have a preference for honesty and suffer a psychological cost 𝑡! > 0 when abusing 
their partner’s trust, and the idiosyncratic cost of cheating for the H-type players is so 
high that they will never cheat: 𝑡! > 𝑥 + 𝑠. L-type players instead are only interested 
in (expected) monetary payoffs (i.e. 𝑡! = 0), so they will always cheat when in the 
role of second movers. For simplicity, we also assume that players are risk neutral.  
 
Figure 1: the basic trust game. 
 
At the beginning of the stage game, all players are randomly assigned to the role of 
first or second mover, and matched in pairs. Players choose their strategy before 
knowing their role, and the strategy determines their action both as the first and as the 
second mover. Let p represent the proportion of H-type players in the society, which 
is assumed to be common knowledge. It is straightforward to verify that, regardless of 
his type, a player will trust as a first mover if 𝑝 > !!!!. Let us denote this threshold 𝛩. 
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a).  A collective punishment mechanism 
Now consider the introduction of a collective punishment mechanism into the trust 
game, as depicted in Figure 2. In this new game, besides possibly suffering the 
psychological cost 𝑡!, the player who cheats faces the risk of being punished by his 
peers. This potential punishment 𝑧𝑞 depends on two elements: the strength z of the 
sanction implemented collectively by the players who do not cheat - which is 
exogenously given - and the fraction q of transactions in society where cheating does 
not take place. The behavior of the H-type players as second movers is not affected by 
the sanction, as they would never cheat, in any case. The behavior of the L-type 
players instead might change, as they may choose not to cheat either, if 𝑞! ≥ !!!! , 
where 𝑞! represents player i’s beliefs about q. Let us denote this second threshold θ. 
 
Figure 2: the trust game with an exogenous collective punishment mechanism. 
 
 
In the following, we assume that 0 < 𝜃 < 𝛩 < 1, which is consistent with the 
parameters we adopt in the experiment. If the proportion 𝑝 of H-types in society is 
larger than the threshold θ then in the game with collective punishment, any player i 
will never cheat as a second mover and will always trust as a first mover, regardless 
of his own type. If instead 𝑝 < 𝜃, this game becomes a coordination game with two 
Pareto-ranked equilibria. In the low-efficiency equilibrium, L-type players cheat in 
the role of second mover, and nobody trusts as a first mover. In the high-efficiency 
equilibrium, instead, neither L-types nor H-types cheat as second movers, and 
everybody trusts as a first mover. There exists, however, the risk of miscoordination, 
as subjects cannot be certain of the strategy the others will adopt.  
Let 𝛽! be player i’s belief about the fraction of the other players who adopt the 
cooperative strategy (trust, do not cheat) in the trust game with a collective 
punishment mechanism. Then, we could obtain the belief 𝑞! about the total number 
of players who will not cheat, which depends on two elements: the proportion of 
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intrinsically trustworthy players 𝑝, and the belief  𝛽!. 𝑞! = 𝑝 + 1− 𝑝 𝛽!   
To summarize, for any value of 𝑝, the introduction of a collective punishment 
mechanism does not decrease trustworthiness with respect to the baseline scenario, 
and might increase both trust and trustworthiness, if the proportion of H-types 𝑝 is 
high enough, or if a sufficiently high number of players have high beliefs 𝛽! about 
the fraction of the other players who adopt the cooperative strategy.8 
Hypothesis 1: In presence of a collective punishment mechanism, the levels of trust 
and trustworthiness are equal or higher than in the baseline scenario.  
b).  Endogenous adoption of the collective punishment mechanism 
We now consider the case in which, prior to playing the game (and before roles are 
assigned), players express their preference on whether to have or not a collective 
punishment mechanism in place. More specifically, we consider the case in which the 
implementation of the punishment mechanism is determined by a majority voting rule. 
The main question we would like to pursue is whether this mechanism can affect the 
beliefs qi, thus serving as a coordination device to drive the society towards the 
efficient equilibrium.  
Let us consider again the behavior of player 𝑖 in the game with a collective 
punishment mechanism in place. Depending on the player i's belief 𝑞! , we can 
envisage five possible cases based on the types of players. For the L-type, i.e. selfish 
players, there are three possible scenarios: 
(i.) 𝑞! ≤ 𝜃 < 𝛩 ≤ 1: the player chooses the strategy (do not trust, cheat); 
(ii.) 𝜃 < 𝑞! < 𝛩 ≤ 1: the player chooses the strategy (do not trust, do not cheat); 
(iii.) 𝑞! ≥ 𝛩: the player chooses the strategy (trust, do not cheat).  
 
For the H-type, i.e. intrinsically trustworthy players, there are two possible 
scenarios: 
(iv.) 𝑞! < 𝛩   ≤ 1: the player chooses the strategy (do not trust, do not cheat); 
(v.) 𝑞! ≥ 𝛩: the player chooses the strategy (trust, do not cheat). 
However, these boil down to the first three scenarios, as (ii) and (iv) coincide, as 
well as (iii) and (v). Let us now calculate the player’s expected profit in the trust game 
with collective punishment, under these three alternative scenarios. Remember that in 
                                                        
8 An alternative, behavioral hypothesis is that the exogenous introduction of a punishment mechanism 
could crowd out intrinsic motivations for trustworthiness (Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012; Fehr and 
Rockenbach, 2003). 
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the basic trust game, when 𝑝 <   𝛩   < 1, player i’s expected profit is equal to 𝑥, no 
matter what, while if 𝑝 >   𝛩, then in the basic trust game player 𝑖 would trust as a 
first mover, and everyone else does the same. In this case his expected payoff depends 
on his type. 
Scenario (i). As a first mover, player 𝑖 will not trust, hence he will be sure to earn 𝑥. As a second mover he will earn 𝑥 if his partner does not trust, and 2𝑥 + 2𝑠 − 𝑧𝑞! 
if his partner chooses to trust. Because 𝛽! is player i’s belief about the fraction of 
other players who adopt the cooperative strategy (trust, do not cheat), he will expect 
the former event to take place with probability 1− 𝛽!, and the latter with probability 𝛽! . Hence, the expected profit a player can obtain in the game with collective 
punishment is: 
𝐸 𝜋! = 12 𝑥 + 12 𝑥 1− 𝛽! + 2𝑥 + 2𝑠 − 𝑧𝑞! 𝛽! = 𝑥 + 𝛽!2 𝑥 + 2𝑠 − 𝑧𝑞!  
The expected profit above is greater than 𝑥 if 𝑞! < !!!!! , which is true for every 𝑞! ≤ 𝜃 = !!!! . Hence, a selfish player with belief 𝑞𝑖 ≤ 𝜃 will prefer to have the 
punishment mechanism in place. 
Scenario (ii). As a first mover, the player 𝑖 will not trust, hence he will be sure to 
earn 𝑥. As a second mover he will earn 𝑥 if his partner does not trust, which 
happens with probability 1− 𝛽!, and 𝑥 + 𝑠 if his partner chooses to trust, which 
happens with probability 𝛽!. Hence, the expected profit in the game with collective 
punishment is: 
𝐸 𝜋! = 12 𝑥 + 12 𝑥 1− 𝛽! + 𝑥 + 𝑠 𝛽! = 𝑥 + 𝛽!2 𝑠 ≥ 𝑥 
Hence, both a selfish player and an intrinsically trustworthy player with beliefs 𝜃 < 𝑞! < 𝛩 will prefer to have the collective punishment mechanism in place. 
Scenario (iii). As a first mover, player 𝑖 will trust, hence he will earn 𝑥 + 𝑠 with 
probability 𝑞! and 0 with probability 1− 𝑞!. As a second mover he will earn 𝑥 if 
his partner does not trust, which happens with probability 1− 𝛽!, and 𝑥 + 𝑠 if his 
partner trusts, which happens with probability 𝛽!. Hence, the expected profit a player 
can obtain in the game with collective punishment is: 
𝐸 𝜋! = 12 𝑞! 𝑥 + 𝑠 + 12 𝑥 1− 𝛽! + 𝑥 + 𝑠 𝛽! = 12 [𝑞! 𝑥 + 𝑠 + 𝑥 + 𝛽!𝑠] 
In this case, however, the expected payoff 𝐸 𝜋!   in the basic trust game depends on 
player 𝑖’s type, and on whether 𝑝 >   𝛩. If 𝑝 <   𝛩 ≤ 𝑞! then 𝐸 𝜋! = 𝑥 <   𝐸 𝜋!  
and player 𝑖 will vote in favor of the punishment mechanism. Indeed, the expected 
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profit in presence of collective punishment is grater than 𝑥 if 𝑞! 𝑥 + 𝑠 + 𝛽!𝑠 > 𝑥, 
which holds for every 𝑞! ≥ 𝛩 = !!!!. Hence, both a selfish player and an intrinsically 
trustworthy player with 𝑝 <   𝛩 ≤ 𝑞! will prefer to have the punishment mechanism 
in place. 
If instead 𝑝 > 𝛩, the preferences of H-type and L-type players will differ. If 
player 𝑖 is an H-type, in the basic trust game as a first mover he will trust, hence 
expecting to earn 𝑥 + 𝑠 with probability 𝑝 and 0 with probability 1− 𝑝. As a 
second mover he earns 𝑥 + 𝑠 because all first movers should trust. Hence, the 
expected profit a player can obtain is: 
𝐸 𝜋! = 12𝑝 𝑥 + 𝑠 + 12 𝑥 + 𝑠 = 1+ 𝑝2 𝑥 + 𝑠  
Consider also that if 𝑝 > 𝛩 then 𝑞! = 𝛽! = 1 for all players. Hence 𝐸 𝜋! = 𝑥 +𝑠 ≥ 𝐸 𝜋! : when 𝑝 > 𝛩, H-type players will always vote in favor of collective 
punishment. 
By contrast, if player 𝑖 is an L-type, in the basic trust game as a first mover he 
will trust, hence he will earn 𝑥 + 𝑠 with probability 𝑝 and 0 with probability 1− 𝑝. 
As a second mover he earns 2(𝑥 + 𝑠) because all first movers should trust, and he 
will cheat. Hence, the expected profit a player can obtain is: 
𝐸 𝜋! = 12𝑝 𝑥 + 𝑠 + 𝑥 + 𝑠 = 2+ 𝑝2 𝑥 + 𝑠 > 𝑥 + 𝑠 = 𝐸 𝜋!  
Hence, when 𝑝 > 𝛩, L-type players will vote against collective punishment. 
Hypothesis 2: H-type players will always vote in favor of the introduction of a 
collective punishment mechanism; L-type players will also vote in favor of it, unless 
the proportion of H-types is sufficiently high to induce them to trust in the Baseline 
(𝑝 > 𝛩). 
As a consequence, the collective punishment mechanism will always be adopted if 𝛩 ≥ 0.5, which is the case in our experiment. Hence, we can state the following 
hypothesis on the effects of the vote on trust and trustworthiness.  
Hypothesis 3: a majority vote in favor of the collective punishment mechanism does 
not reveal anything on the distribution of types and beliefs, hence it should not affect 
trust and trustworthiness levels, as compared to those observed when the mechanism 
is exogenously introduced. 
3.2 Experimental design 
Our experimental treatments were based on variants of the binary-choice trust 
game (Bohnet et al., 2008) introduced in the previous section. We adopted a 
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within-subject design, in which each participant was exposed to three treatments: 
Baseline, Exogenous and Voting. At the beginning of the session each subject was 
assigned into a group of six. In each treatment, subjects were paired with one of their 
group's members, to play a one-shot game. Matching across treatments was done so to 
ensure that no two subjects would meet more than once.9 The group composition was 
kept constant during the whole session. 
 
Figure 3: the basic trust game, with the parameterization adopted in the Baseline 
treatment. 
 
 
In the Baseline treatment, subjects were asked to play the binary trust game (i.e. 
Baseline game), as parameterized and represented in Figure 3. We adopted the 
strategy method (Brandts and Charness, 2011): all subjects had to choose their action 
both as a first mover and as a second mover, before knowing which role they would 
actually be assigned. Once all subjects had made their two choices, roles were 
randomly assigned and subjects were matched in pairs. In each pair, payoffs were 
determined by the choice each of the two players had made for the role he was 
actually assigned. 
In the Exogenous treatment, the strategic environment, the information structure 
and the options subjects had to choose were the same as in the Baseline game but, 
here, a collective punishment mechanism was exogenously introduced, under which 
cheating was sanctioned and the severity depended upon the number of subjects in the 
group, who chose not to cheat as second movers (i.e. Exogenous game, see Figure 
4).10 
                                                        
9 With the exception of the Voting-IF treatment, as illustrated below. 
10 In order to be consistent with the theoretical model, in Figure 4 the size of the sanction (48*q) is 
expressed in terms of the fraction q of subjects who choose not to cheat, in a group of six. In fact, in the 
experimental instructions, we expressed that variable as a function (8*N) of the number N of 
trustworthy players (see Appendix 2). With the parameters adopted in our set up, we have that θ=0.35 
and Θ=0.53. This implies that trusting is profitable even in the Baseline treatment, if the proportion of 
H-types in the society is higher than 0.53, while if this proportion is as high as 0.35, in the Exogenous 
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Figure 4: the trust game with an exogenously imposed collective punishment 
mechanism, with the parameterization adopted in the Exogenous treatment. 
 
After experiencing these two variations of the trust game, subjects entered the third 
treatment (Voting). At the beginning of this last treatment, before roles were assigned, 
subjects were asked to vote for implementing either the Baseline or the Exogenous 
game, then a majority voting mechanism determined which of the two variations of 
trust games would have been ultimately played within the group, in this final phase. 
Abstention was not allowed. Before playing this third trust game, subjects were 
informed of the number of their group members who voted in favor of either option.  
To reduce the risk of spillover effects, the outcomes of these three games were not 
revealed to the subjects, until the end of the session.11 In addition, to control for 
possible order effects, in four sessions subjects were exposed to the Baseline 
treatment first, then they played the Exogenous treatment and finally the Voting 
treatment, while in other four sessions the order of the first two treatments was 
reversed.12 
In order to examine whether having information about the aggregate behavior with 
and without collective punishment affected the individual voting behavior, in four of 
the sessions we introduced one additional treatment, after the Voting treatment. This 
treatment, denoted Voting-IF, was identical to the Voting treatment, with two 
exceptions. First, before voting subjects received information on the aggregate 
behavior of their group members in the Baseline and Exogenous treatments. More 
specifically, they were shown the number of subjects who chose either option, as a 
first and as a second mover, in each of the two treatments. Second, subjects were told 
that their partner might have been be the same person as in one of the previous three 
games. 
                                                                                                                                                               
treatment not cheating becomes more profitable than cheating. 
11 Each part of the instructions was distributed and read just before subjects started to play the 
corresponding game, which implies that subjects had no prior knowledge about the next part of the 
experiment. 
12 For more information on the treatments and sessions, please refer to Table A in the Appendix 1. 
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Since our experiment was relatively complex, to ensure full understanding of the 
instructions, subjects were asked to complete a comprehension quiz with calculations 
and questions before making decisions in each stage game (see Appendix 2). Subjects 
were rewarded with €0.40 for each question they answered correctly at the first try. 
There were six questions per treatment (no questions before the Voting-IF treatment), 
hence subjects could earn in total €7.20 for the comprehension quiz. 
At the end of the session, all subjects had to fill in a questionnaire including 
questions on their individual characteristics (gender, age, education, social status), 
general trust, risk attitudes, social preferences and cognitive abilities (see the 
Appendix 3 for the complete text of the questionnaire). These questions allowed us to 
study how personal characteristics may affect the voting behavior, as well as the 
impact of the endogenous/exogenous introduction of collective punishment on 
individual behavior. 
The experiment involved 96 subjects, divided in 8 sessions (see Table A in 
Appendix 1) and was conducted at the Bologna Laboratory for Experiments in Social 
Sciences (BLESS). Subjects were mostly undergraduate students at the University of 
Bologna, and were recruited through ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). About 53 percent of the 
subjects were male; nobody took part in more than one session. The experiment was 
programmed and implemented using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). For 
each session, after showing up to the lab at the pre-scheduled session time, the 12 
participants were randomly assigned to cubicles to avoid eye contact, and no 
communication was allowed during the experiment. The average session lasted about 
1 hour and 15 minutes. Subjects were paid privately in cash at the end of the session 
and earned on average 18.25 Euros, including the earnings from the comprehension 
quiz. No show-up fee was given.13 
4. Results 
In this section we carry out four steps of analysis. First, we juxtapose data from the 
Baseline and the Exogenous treatments, in order to analyze whether exogenously 
introducing collective punishment enhances the levels of trust and of trustworthiness 
in society. Second, we study subjects’ voting behavior, and test whether a majority of 
subjects vote in favor of collective punishment as predicted in our theoretical model. 
We also investigate who are the subjects who vote in favor of the punishment 
mechanism, and whether they differ from those who vote against it, along any 
significant dimension. Third, we examine whether the endogenous introduction of a 
collective punishment mechanism promotes efficiency by boosting trust and 
trustworthiness with respect to the case in which such a mechanism is exogenously 
                                                        
13 For each session we recruited 15 subjects, to take into account possible no-show-ups, but only 12 
students were randomly selected to participate in the experiments. Supernumerary subjects were paid 5 
Euros and had to leave before the session started. 
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imposed. We also study whether the endogenous choice not to adopt collective 
punishment depresses trust and trustworthiness, as predicted by our model. Finally, 
we examine whether the exposure to information about the aggregate behavior of 
their members in the Baseline and Exogenous treatments affects a subject’s decision 
to vote in favor of the punishment mechanism. 
4.1 Effects of collective punishment, when exogenously imposed 
The main difference between Baseline and Exogenous games lies in the way the 
payoff of the player in the role of a second mover (i.e. trustee) depends on the other 
trustees’ behavior, in case he chooses to abuse his partner’s trust. This manipulation 
has a direct effect on trustworthiness and only an indirect effect on trust, because the 
player in the role of a first mover (i.e. trustor) will change her behavior only if she 
expects collective punishment to have a (direct) effect on the others’ levels of 
trustworthiness. For this reason, we first present the results about trustees’ behavior 
and then illustrate trustors’ behavior. 
As shown in Figure 5, the fraction of the trustworthy actions is larger when the 
collective punishment mechanism is exogenously imposed. More specifically, only 
38.5% of subjects in the role of trustee reciprocate trust in the Baseline treatment 
while 82.3% of trustees in the Exogenous treatment behave trustworthily. The 
difference is strongly significant (p<0.001). If not specified otherwise, comparisons 
across treatments are performed by means of logit regressions, where the only 
explanatory variable is a treatment dummy, and standard errors are robust for 
clustering at the subject's level. Two-tailed z-tests using each subject as an 
independent observation always confirm the results. 
Figure 5: frequency of trustful and trustworthy choices in the Baseline and 
Exogenous treatments.  
 
Notes: One observation per subject, per treatment. The whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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The impact of collective punishment on trustees' behavior emerges regardless of 
the order in which subjects are exposed to the Baseline and the Exogenous treatment, 
the level of trustworthiness being almost twice as high in the latter than in the former 
(p<0.001 in both cases, Table B in the Appendix 1). In addition, when we compare 
behavior across subjects, and focus exclusively on the first game played in each 
session, we observe that the difference in trustworthiness remains highly significant 
(p<0.001, Table B in the Appendix 1). 
Figure 5 also shows that the overall level of trust is higher in the Exogenous than 
in the Baseline treatment. Specifically, while the average level of trust in the Baseline 
game is 28.1%, it reaches 39.6% in the Exogenous game, and the difference is 
statistically significant (p=0.040). However, if we control for the order effect, we find 
that when Baseline is implemented first the exogenously imposed punishment 
mechanism does not significantly enhance the trust (p=0.784). Conversely, when the 
punishment mechanism is implemented first but removed afterwards, the level of trust 
drops dramatically (p=0.012, see Table C in Appendix 1). We can summarize our 
results as follows. 
Result 1: the presence of a collective punishment mechanism significantly increases 
trustworthiness, and to a lesser extent also trust. 
4.2 Endogenous adoption of collective punishment 
Our theoretical model predicts that, in the Voting treatment, H-types would always 
vote in favor of the collective punishment mechanism, while L-types would vote 
against it only if the proportion of H-types in society is very high (Hypothesis 2). Our 
data reveal instead that only a minority of subjects (30.2%) vote in favor of the 
mechanism, and that subjects’ voting behavior does not seem to depend on their 
preferences or beliefs. This result does not depend on the order of the first two 
treatments: 29.2% of subjects vote in favor of the mechanism when the Baseline 
treatment is first played, while 31.2% opt for the punishment mechanism when 
subjects are first exposed to the Exogenous treatment, and the difference is not 
statistically significant (p=0.825). 
Since we adopt the strategy method in the experiment, for every subject we 
observe both choices (as a trustor and a trustee) in each treatment. By looking at 
subjects' behavior as trustees in the Baseline treatment, we can classify subjects as 
L-types and H-types: by definition, those who do not cheat in the Baseline are H-types. 
Information on the choice as first movers is also relevant in order to predict voting 
behavior. Indeed, according to our model, L-type players would vote against the 
introduction of the punishment mechanism only if they trust in the Baseline. Table 1 
reports the distribution of subjects, along these two dimensions. 
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Table 1: subjects' behavior in the Baseline treatment. 
 Trust in Baseline 
Reciprocate in Baseline Yes No Total 
Yes (H-type) 20.8% 17.7% 38.5% 
No (L-type) 7.3% 54.2% 61.5% 
Total 28.1% 71.9% 100.0% 
 
Table 1 reveals that, according to our predictions, only 7.3% of the subjects would 
have voted against the adoption of collective punishment, in the Voting treatment, 
while in our experiment this proportion was much higher. 
To better understand the source of this discrepancy between our results and the 
theoretical predictions, we now investigate the determinants of subjects' voting 
decision. First, we divide subjects into two categories, depending on their voting 
decisions: against collective punishment and pro-punishment. We find that these two 
categories of subjects have similar levels of trust and trustworthiness in the Baseline 
treatment, implying that there is no difference in the preferences or ex-ante beliefs 
between them (p=0.165 for the difference in trust level, and p=0.409 for the 
difference in trustworthiness level). P-values in this paragraph are obtained by means 
of logit regressions where the only explanatory variable is a dummy taking value one 
for subjects who voted in favor of the punishment mechanism in the Voting treatment, 
and with standard errors robust for clustering at the subject's level. Results are always 
confirmed by two-tailed z-tests using each subject as an independent observation. 
Figure 6: differences in trust between subjects who voted in favor and against 
collective punishment. 
 
Notes: One observation per subject, per treatment. The whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals. 
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In the Exogenous treatment, as revealed in Figure 6, subjects who vote in favor of 
collective punishment are more likely to trust their partners than others (72.4% vs. 
25.4%, p<0.001). We also find that these pro-punishment subjects react more to the 
introduction of the punishment mechanism, i.e. they are more likely to increase their 
level of trust from the Baseline to the Exogenous game, as compared to the subjects 
who voted against the mechanism (p=0.002). 
Table 2: Logit regressions on the determinants of subjects' voting behavior. 
Dependent variable: Vote Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Trust-BL 0.126 
(0.109) 
 0.021 
(0.086) 
Trustworthiness-BL 0.022 
(0.106) 
 0.069 
(0.111) 
Trust-EX 
 
 0.342*** 
(0.054) 
0.334*** 
(0.033) 
Trustworthiness-EX 
 
 0.146 
(0.120) 
0.089 
(0.104) 
Controls No No Yes 
Number of Observations 96 96 96 
Notes: Marginal effects from logit regressions (Standard errors robust for clustering at the session level 
are reported in parentheses). Trust-BL (Trustworthiness-BL) equals 1 for subjects choosing to trust 
(reciprocate) in the Baseline treatment; Trust-EX (Trustworthiness-EX) equals 1 for subjects choosing 
to trust (reciprocate) in the Exogenous treatment; Controls indicates the presence of fourteen regressors, 
aimed at controlling for subjects' individual characteristics. These include all the variables listed in 
Table 3. The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
To dig deeper into these differences, we run a series of logit regressions (Table 2). 
The dependent variable indicates whether the subject voted in favor of collective 
punishment. In Model 1 we introduce subjects’ choices in the Baseline as explanatory 
variables, finding that subjects’ preferences and their ex-ante beliefs about others do 
not affect their voting behavior. In Model 2, we instead use their choices in the 
Exogenous treatment as explanatory variables. Our result shows that the probability 
that a subject votes in favor of collective punishment is 34.2% higher when she chose 
to trust in the Exogenous. This strongly significant difference reappears in the Model 
3 where we include all four choices of subjects in both the Baseline and Exogenous 
treatments, which suggests that only those who can anticipate the impact of collective 
punishment on others' trustworthiness, and react to it with a higher level of trust, are 
inclined to vote in favor of it. 
Result 2. Only about 30% of subjects vote in favor of the collective punishment 
mechanism, and the voting behavior does not depend on subjects' preferences and 
beliefs. 
Our next step is to explore the question of whether subjects’ individual 
characteristics affect their voting behavior. Table 3 reveals that subjects who vote in 
favor of the punishment mechanism have higher cognitive abilities than the others, as 
 20 
supported by an ordered logit regression on the number of correct answers given to 
the three questions of the Cognitive Reflection Test. The result is confirmed if we 
look at the IQ test to measure subjects’ cognitive abilities, which also reveals that 
subjects who vote in favor of collective punishment are significantly more likely to 
answer correctly. Results in Table 3 also indicate that, although our experimental 
design is relatively complicated, subjects could answer most of the control questions 
correctly before playing the game and, on average, the subjects who voted against or 
in favor of the punishment mechanism could provide a similar number of right 
answers. This implies that all subjects could well understand the instructions, and that 
differences in the voting behavior are not driven by comprehension problems.  
Table 3: Individual characteristics and voting. 
Individual 
characteristics 
Against 
(N=67) 
In favor 
(N=29) 
Significance of the difference 
Male 49.3% 62.1%                p>0.1b 
Age 25.6 24.1                p=0.079a 
Higher education 67.2% 44.8%                p=0.049b 
CRT 1.1 1.6                p=0.093a 
IQ 1.2 1.7                p=0.002a 
Economics 50.7% 48.3%                p>0.1b 
Statistics 44.8% 58.6%                p>0.1b 
Game theory 28.4% 20.7%                p>0.1b 
Trust 17.9% 17.2%                p>0.1b 
Altruism 7.8 8                p>0.1a 
Risk aversion 5.8 5.2                p>0.1a 
RightAnswerBL 5.4 5.2                p>0.1a 
RightAnswerEXO 5.1 5.2                p>0.1a 
RightAnswerVOTE 5.6 5.6                p>0.1a 
Notes: Male is a dummy taking value 1 for males and 0 for females; Age indicates subjects’ age; 
Higher education equals 1 for those who have obtained at least a bachelor degree, and 0 otherwise; 
CRT ranges between 0 and 3 and is calculated by a three-item cognitive reflection test introduced by 
Frederick (2005); IQ ranges between 0 and 3 and is calculated by a three-item IQ test; Economics, 
Statistics, and Game theory are dummies taking value 1 for those who have taken at least one course in 
economics, statistics, or game theory, respectively; Trust equals 1 for those whose answer to the WVS 
on generalized trust is positive, and 0 otherwise; Altruism corresponds to our questionnaire-based 
measure of altruism; Risk aversion indicates subjects’ answer to the risk attitude question; 
RightAnswerBL, RightAnswerEXO, and RightAnswerVOTE indicate the number of the correct answers 
to the control questions in the Baseline, Exogenous, and Voting treatment, respectively. 
The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
a Ordered logit regression, with standard errors robust for clustering at the subject's level. 
b Logit regression, with standard errors robust for clustering at the subject's level. 
Table 4 reports results from three logit regressions providing further support for 
this result. The dependent variable is a dummy taking value one for the subjects who 
voted in favor of collective punishment. Model 1, where the only explanatory variable 
is CRT, indicates that cognitive abilities measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test 
are not significantly correlated with subjects’ voting behavior. When we measure 
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cognitive abilities based on the IQ questions in Model 2, instead, we find that the 
probability of voting for the punishment mechanism is 24.2% larger among subjects 
with higher cognitive abilities relative to other subjects. In Model 3 we include as 
regressors three dummy variables meant to capture the academic background of the 
subjects. Results indicate that subjects who have some prior knowledge of statistics 
are more likely to vote in favor of the punishment mechanism. These significant 
results still hold in Model 4 where we introduce additional controls for individual 
characteristics (listed in Table 3) and for subjects' choices in the Baseline and 
Exogenous treatments (listed in Table 2). These regressions suggest that only subjects 
who have higher cognitive abilities, or have a background in statistics, are able to 
fully anticipate the consequences of the introduction of collective punishment, hence 
its profitability. 
 
Table 4: Voting behavior and individual characteristics 
Dependent variable: 
Vote  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
CRT 0.076 
(0.048) 
  -0.003 
(0.041) 
IQ  0.242** 
(0.102) 
 0.176* 
(0.091) 
Economics 
 
  0.010 
(0.060) 
-0.076 
(0.092) 
Statistics 
 
  0.188*** 
(0.078) 
0.169* 
(0.086) 
Game theory   -0.124 
(0.067) 
-0.123 
(0.089) 
Trust-BL    0.021 
(0.086) 
Trustworthiness-BL    0.069 
(0.111) 
Trust-EX 
 
   0.334*** 
(0.033) 
Trustworthiness-EX 
 
   0.089 
(0.104) 
Controls  No No No Yes 
N. Obs. 96 96 96 96 
Notes: Marginal effects from logit regressions (standard errors robust for clustering at the session level 
are reported in parentheses). CRT ranges between 0 and 3 and is calculated by a three-item cognitive 
reflection test introduced by Frederick (2005); IQ ranges between 0 and 3 and is calculated by a 
three-item IQ test. Economics, Statistics, and Game theory are dummies taking value 1 for those who 
have taken at least one course in economics, statistics, or game theory, respectively; Controls indicates 
the presence of the remaining nine controls for individual characteristics (see Table 3).  
The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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4.3 Effects of the endogenous adoption or rejection of the punishment mechanism 
The existing experimental literature on public good games has shown that there is 
a “dividend of democracy” in the sense that institutions endogenously chosen through 
voting can be more efficient than the same institutions being exogenously imposed on 
decision makers (Dal Bo et al., 2010; Sutter et al., 2010). One possible reason is that 
voting for the deterrent (or non-deterrent) institutions that punish uncooperative 
subjects credibly signals an intention to establish a high level of cooperation and 
thereby induces other group members to do the same. Consequently, the voting 
mechanism promotes coordination on the efficient, cooperative outcome (Markussen 
et al., 2014). In this part, we investigate whether “the dividend of democracy” can 
also be observed in our setting. Specifically, we investigate whether the punishment 
mechanism, when endogenously chosen, could significantly increase the levels of 
trust and trustworthiness relative to the case in which it is exogenously imposed. 
Result 3. When subjects vote for (not) introducing collective punishment, the levels of 
trust and trustworthiness are not significantly different from the case in which 
collective punishment is exogenously (not) introduced.  
In our study, only three groups endogenously adopt the collective punishment 
mechanism, while the other thirteen groups play the baseline trust game in the Voting 
treatment. Consider the behavior of subjects in the role of trustee first. When the 
majority of the group members vote against the implementation of collective 
punishment, the average level of trustworthiness does not change substantially, 
decreasing from 34.6% to 33.3%, relative to the Baseline treatment. Similarly, in 
groups where collective punishment is endogenously adopted trustworthiness levels 
decreased from 100% to 94.4%, relative to the Exogenous treatment. Neither 
difference is statistically significant (p=0.318 for the former comparison, and p=0.225 
for the latter).  
Similar results emerge if we focus on trusting behavior: when subjects vote for not 
introducing the punishment mechanism, compared to the Baseline, the level of trust 
drops from 25.6% to 23.1%, while the fraction of trustful behavior remains stable at 
55.6% in groups where the collective punishment mechanism is determined by the 
majority voting mechanism. These two differences are also not statistically significant 
(p=0.286 for the former comparison, and p=0.190 for the latter). 
While “the dividend of democracy” has been often observed in previous 
experimental papers, our study fails to find any positive effect of the voting 
mechanism on the society’s ability to coordinate on an efficient outcome. Part of the 
reason is that the exogenously imposed punishment mechanism had induced a higher 
level of trust and trustworthiness among those who endogenously adopt it, hence there 
is little space for improvement. Another possible reason is that, when the mechanism 
is endogenously chosen, not all subjects positively react to it, but only those who 
voted in favor of it. 
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Indeed, we find that the three groups where the punishment mechanism was 
endogenously activated achieved a higher level of trustworthiness in the Exogenous 
treatment: the average level of trustworthiness is 100% in these three groups and 78.2% 
in the other thirteen groups, and the difference is significant (p<0.001). These three 
groups also exhibit higher levels of trust than other groups in the Exogenous treatment. 
The average level of trust is 55.6% in the three groups where the punishment 
mechanism is endogenously imposed and 35.9% in the other thirteen groups, and the 
difference is significant (p=0.009). In this paragraph, comparisons are based on logit 
regressions where the only explanatory variable is a dummy taking value one for 
subjects belonging to the three groups who adopted the collective punishment 
mechanism in the Voting treatment, and standard errors robust for clustering at the 
subject's level.  
In addition, within these three groups, we could not find that all subjects positively 
react to the collectively determined punishment mechanism. Our results suggest that 
the endogenously chosen mechanism makes those who prefer its activation act more 
trustfully, while other subjects who vote against collective punishment seem to be 
immune to it. In fact, when collective punishment is endogenously chosen, those who 
vote in favor of it increase their trust level from 70% to 80% respect to the Exogenous 
treatment, while others reduce their trust level from 37.5% to 25%. Due to the limited 
sample, however, we cannot detect whether these differences are statistically 
significant. 
4.4 Effects of information about others' behavior on voting 
We now turn to the question of whether feedback about the aggregate behavior in 
the group, with and without collective punishment, could help subjects understand the 
effectiveness of the punishment mechanism, thereby changing their voting behavior. 
In the last 4 experimental sessions, we added a fourth game, where subjects received 
information on the aggregate behavior of their group members in the Baseline and 
Exogenous treatments before deciding whether to vote for or against collective 
punishment (see Section 3).  
Result 4. Even though exposed to feedback about others' past behavior, the large 
majority of subjects do not change their vote. Only information about others’ trust 
levels in the Exogenous game positively affects a subjects' decision to vote in favor of 
the punishment mechanism. 
Among the 48 subjects who took part in these additional sessions, only 8 (i.e. 
16.7%) changed their vote after observing the aggregate information about the first 
two treatments. Of them, five subjects voted in favor of collective punishment in the 
Voting-IF treatment, and three voted against it. A logit regression indicates that there 
is no difference in the voting behavior between in the Voting and Voting-IF treatments 
(p=0.438). Only two groups endogenously adopted the collective punishment 
mechanism in the last treatment. To explore subjects' voting behavior in more depth, 
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we run two logit regressions, whose results are reported in Table 5. 
The dependent variable is a dummy taking value one when the subject voted in 
favor of collective punishment. N. Trust-BL (N. Trustworthiness-BL) indicates the 
number of the other group members who are trustful (trustworthy) in the Baseline 
treatment; N. Trust-EX (N. Trustworthiness-EX) indicates the number of the other 
group members who are trustful (trustworthy) in the Exogenous treatment; 
Pro-punishment Vote equals 1 if the subject voted in favor of the punishment 
mechanism in the third game. Model 1 shows that observing an additional trustful 
group member in the Exogenous game increased the probability of a subject voting 
for the punishment mechanism by 17.5%. It also highlights the high persistency of 
voting behavior: the probability that a subject votes in favor of the punishment 
mechanism in the Voting-IF treatment is 47.1% higher when s/he preferred to vote for 
the punishment mechanism rather than against it in the Voting treatment. In order to 
examine whether the subjects who voted in favor of the punishment mechanism in 
Voting are more sensitive to the feedback on others’ trust levels in the Exogenous, we 
include the interaction term into Model 2, finding that the pro-punishment subjects are 
not better than the others at using the aggregate information. To sum up, these results 
imply that the additional information could not help subjects to understand the 
effectiveness of the punishment mechanism, regardless of their voting behavior in the 
third game. 
 
Table 5: Voting behavior and feedback information. 
Dependent variable: Vote Model 1 Model 2 
N. Trust-BL -0.043 
(0.032) 
-0.043 
(0.032) 
N. Trustworthiness-BL 0.013 
(0.081) 
0.013 
(0.081) 
N. Trust-EX 
 
0.175** 
(0.072) 
0.166*** 
(0.070) 
N. Trustworthiness-EX  0.079 
(0.076) 
0.079 
(0.076) 
Pro-punishment Vote 0.471*** 
(0.105) 
0.424*** 
(0.095) 
N. Trust-EX × Pro-punishment Vote  0.034 
(0.028) 
N. Obs. 48 48 
Notes: Marginal effects from logit regressions (standard errors robust for clustering at the session level 
are reported in parentheses).  
The symbols *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper, we explore whether the endogenous adoption of a collective 
punishment mechanism can help a society coordinate on an efficient outcome, 
characterized by high levels of trust and trustworthiness. We first introduce a 
theoretical analysis of the consequences of the introduction of a collective punishment 
mechanism, which largely builds upon Anderlini and Terlizzese’s (2013) work. We 
then design and run an experiment to empirically test the theoretical predictions we 
previously derived. 
We find that subjects exhibit significantly higher levels of trust and trustworthiness 
when a collective punishment mechanism is imposed exogenously. In contrast with 
the previous studies on the “dividend of democracy”, however, we fail to observe that 
the punishment mechanism induces higher level of cooperation when it is 
democratically chosen compared to the case in which it is exogenously activated. One 
potential explanation is that in most previous studies based on the public game the 
subjects could directly inflict punishment on low contributors to enforce the 
endogenously determined rule, or the punishment was fixed and determined ex-ante 
by the experimenter. By contrast, in our trust game, even when the social sanction 
rule is democratically introduced, the severity of punishment depends on the average 
behavior in society, which makes it more unpredictable from the subjects' perspective; 
hence a higher cognitive effort is necessary to anticipate how others will react to the 
rule, and to predict its overall effects on profits and welfare. Further experimental 
studies are needed to more precisely pin down the mechanisms driving these 
differences in results. 
Another important finding is that a majority of subjects vote against the collective 
punishment mechanism, even though from an ex post perspective it would have paid 
off, on average, to vote in favor of it. Previous experimental studies have shown that 
subjects are reluctant to choose a punishment institution when facing alternative 
options. In Sutter et al. (2010), subjects are allowed to vote for a voluntary 
contribution mechanism (VCM), an institution with reward possibility and an 
institution with punishment possibility. The authors report that under unanimous 
voting, the punishment option is rarely selected. A similar behavior pattern is also 
observed in Botelho et al. (2007). After having experienced both the VCM and the 
VCM with the punishment option, subjects decide to choose the governing institution 
for the final period. Botelho et al. (2007) find that in their experiment 77.8% of 
subjects vote against the punishment institution. One possible reason is that subjects 
may naturally dislike the punishment since it evokes negative feelings. To test 
whether opting against the sanction is mainly driven by a “natural aversion” to 
punishment, in future research we plan to run a follow-up experiment where we 
reframe the game without changing the incentives, and substitute penalties with 
rewards. Another potential explanation is that cognitive limitations may refrain 
subjects from anticipating the positive effect of the introduction of collective 
punishment. Putterman et al. (2011) find that intelligence predicts subjects’ votes on 
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efficient schemes when they are permitted to vote over a menu of sanction rules. Our 
study also confirms that subjects with high cognitive abilities are more likely to 
anticipate the effectiveness of collective punishment and therefore vote in favor of it.  
In an additional treatment, we investigate whether the information about the others' 
aggregate behavior with and without collective punishment affects subjects’ voting 
choices, finding that subjects hardly change their votes respect to the no-feedback 
condition. In Gurerk (2013), before a voting phase in which they choose among 
alternative institutions governing the public good provision, subjects are provided 
with the complete history of a punishment institution which was actually implemented 
in a previous experiment. The author finds that social information significantly 
induces more subjects to accept the punishment option and reach full contributions 
more quickly over time. Our study fails to replicate the positive effect of social 
information, a result which is in line with some previous studies, showing that a high 
percentage of subjects are reluctant to select a relatively efficient mechanism even 
when they are exposed to the complete information on subjects’ behavior under the 
alternative institutional regimes (Dal Bo et al., 2010; Gurerk, et al., 2006; Hilbe, et al., 
2014). One possible reason is that subjects may need repetition to fully understand the 
change in incentives introduced by the collective punishment mechanism, and its 
effects on others' behavior; we see this as an interesting route for future research. 
Another possible way of promoting the endogenous adoption of an 
efficiency-enhancing institution is group communication. Alm et al. (1999) 
investigate the effect of voting on a social norm of tax compliance by letting subjects 
vote via majority rule on different aspects of the fiscal system. They find that, without 
communication, subjects vote against an increase in the levels of sanction 
enforcement imposed on tax evaders. However, when subjects are allowed to 
communicate before voting, they are more likely to select a greater level of 
enforcement, achieving an overall increase in efficiency. Along these lines, we could 
also expand our set-up and examine the question of whether group communication 
before the voting phase facilitates the acceptance of the collective punishment 
institution. All this, however, is left for future research. 
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Supporting Information 
Appendix 1 
Table A: Treatments and sessions 
Session type Baseline-first Exogenous-first Baseline-first 
+Information 
Exogenous first 
+ Information 
Order  BL-EX-VT EX-BL-VT BL-EX-VT-VF EX-BL-VT-VF 
Session dates Dec. 03, 2013; 
Dec. 10, 2013 
Dec.12, 2013 March 20, 2014 
March 24, 2014 
March 20, 2014 
March 24, 2014 
N. Subjects 24 24 24 24 
 
N. Independent 
observations 
24 24 24 24 
Notes: In the table, BL stands for Baseline, EX for Exogenous, VT for Voting, and VF for Voting-IF. 
 
Table B: Order effects on trustworthiness 
 Trustworthiness (%) 
 1st Game  2nd Game 
BL-EXO-VOTE 43.8% <*** 77.1% 
 
∧*** 
 
∨*** 
EXO-BL-VOTE 77.1% >*** 33.3% 
Notes: BL stands for Baseline treatment, EXO for Exogenous treatment, VOTE for Voting treatment. 
*** indicates the significance at 1% level based on a two-tailed z-test. 
 
Table C: Order effects on trust 
 Trust (%) 
 1st Game  2nd Game 
BL-EXO-VOTE 41.7% ~ 43.8% 
 ~  
∨*** 
EXO-BL-VOTE 35.4% >*** 14.6% 
Notes: BL stands for Baseline treatment, EXO for Exogenous treatment, VOTE for Voting treatment. 
*** indicates the significance at 1% level based on a two-tailed z-test. 
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Appendix 2: Experimental instructions (Baseline first + Information) 
 
Welcome. This is a study on how people make decisions. In this study you can earn 
money based on how well you follow the instructions, and on the decisions made by 
you and by the other participants. You will be paid in private and in cash at the end of 
the session. 
Please turn off your mobile phone. From this moment on, no form of communication 
among participants is allowed. If you have any question, or need assistance of any 
kind, please raise your hand and one of us will come to your desk to help you.  
Please, follow the instructions carefully. In this study there are four parts, and for each 
part, we will distribute and read the corresponding instructions. In the first three parts, 
after having read the instructions, we will ask you to answer six questions, to verify 
your full understanding. For every question you answer correctly you earn €0.40. So 
you can earn up to €7.2 by answering correctly to all questions for Parts 1, 2 and 3 of 
the study. In addition you will earn money for the decisions you and the other 
participants will make in Parts 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the study.  
Now, I will read instruction for Part 1. 
 
Instructions for Part 1 
In this part of the study, participants are randomly divided into groups of six. In each 
group, three participants will be assigned the role BLUE, while the other three will be 
RED, then the computer will form pairs of subjects belonging to the same group. If 
you are BLUE, you will be paired with a RED player, and vice versa. Your 
counterpart will never know your true identity, nor will you know hers/his.  
Your earnings are expressed in tokens that will be converted in Euros at the rate of 1 
Euro for 3 tokens. 
BLUE has to make one choice: between option A and option B. RED has to make one 
choice: between option X and option Y. Table 1 summarizes the earnings 
corresponding to BLUE’s and RED’s choices.  
Table	  1:	  earnings	  in	  Part	  1	  
BLUE chooses RED chooses Earnings 
A 
X BLUE: 0 RED: 30 
Y BLUE: 15 RED: 15 
B Irrelevant BLUE: 8 RED: 8 
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If BLUE chooses option A, earnings depend on the choice made by RED: 
• if RED chooses X, BLUE earns 0 tokens and RED earns 30 tokens; 
• if RED chooses Y, BLUE earns 15 tokens and RED earns 15 tokens. 
If BLUE chooses option B, the choice made by RED has no consequences on either 
BLUE’s or RED’s earnings:  
• BLUE earns 8 tokens and RED earns 8 tokens. 
We ask you to make a decision first as RED, then as BLUE. We will inform you of 
the role you are actually assigned in this Part only at the end of the session. 
If you are assigned the BLUE role, your earnings from this part will depend on the 
choice you made as BLUE, and on the choice made by your counterpart as RED. 
If you are assigned the RED role, your earnings from this part will depend on the 
choice you made as RED, and on the choice made by your counterpart as BLUE. 
You will be informed of the results of this Part only at the end of the session.   
We will now make an example. At the end of the example we will ask you to answer 
two questions, to verify you understanding of the instructions. Remember that you 
earn €0.40 for each question you answer correctly. 
Look at your screen. You now have to make a choice as RED. Please, choose X, and 
confirm your choice. Good. You now have to make a choice as BLUE. Please, choose 
B and confirm your choice. Good. On your screen, you will now see two questions. 
Please, give your answers by pressing the corresponding buttons.  
If you are not sure about the answer, you can re-read the instructions. Take your time 
and think carefully before answering the question. 
[As RED, you chose X and as BLUE you chose B. You are assigned the BLUE role, 
and your counterpart, who is assigned the RED role, chose Y.  
• How much do you earn? 
• How much does your counterpart earn?] 
We will now make another example. At the end of the example we will ask you to 
answer two questions, to verify you understanding of the instructions. Remember that 
you earn €0.40 for each question you answer correctly. 
Look at your screen. You now have to make a choice as RED. Please, choose X, and 
confirm your choice. Good. You now have to make a choice as BLUE. Please, choose 
A and confirm your choice. Good. On your screen, you will now see two questions. 
Please, give your answers by pressing the corresponding buttons.  
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[As RED, you chose X and as BLUE you chose A. You are assigned the RED role, and 
your counterpart, who is assigned the BLUE role, chose A.  
• How much do you earn? 
• How much does your counterpart earn?] 
You will now read on your screen the last two questions. Please, give your answers by 
pressing the corresponding buttons. 
• How much are 6 tokens worth, in Euros? 
• Will you know if you are RED or BLUE before making your choice? 
If you have any doubts on the instructions, please raise your hand now. Good, then we 
can start with Part 1. 
 
Instructions for Part 2 
In this part of the study, participants are in the same groups of six as in Part 1. In 
each group, three participants will be assigned the role BLUE, while the other three 
will be RED, then the computer will form pairs of subjects belonging to the same 
group. If you are BLUE, you will be paired with a RED player, and vice versa. Your 
counterpart will never know your true identity, nor will you know hers/his. Your 
counterpart will NOT be the same person as in Part 1. 
Your earnings are expressed in tokens that will be converted in Euros at the rate of 1 
Euro for 3 tokens. You may also lose tokens. In the unlikely event your total earnings 
at the end of the study are negative, you may lose part of the money you earned by 
correctly answering the questions on the instructions. In any case, we guarantee you a 
minimum earning of €5 for your participation. 
BLUE has to make one choice: between option A and option B. RED has to make one 
choice: between option X and option Y. Table 2 summarizes the earnings 
corresponding to BLUE’s and RED’s choices. Earnings for RED may depend on the 
choices made by the other five members of the group. 
Table	  2:	  earnings	  in	  Part	  2	  
BLUE chooses RED chooses Earnings 
A 
X 
BLUE: 0 
RED: 30 – 8 x number of others who choose Y 
Y 
BLUE: 15 
RED: 15 
B Irrelevant 
BLUE: 8 
RED: 8 
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If BLUE chooses option A, earnings depend on the choice made by RED: 
• if RED chooses X, BLUE earns 0 tokens. Earnings for RED depend on the choices 
made as RED by the other five members of the group. Notice that all members of 
your group make decisions both as RED and as BLUE, before knowing the role they 
are actually assigned.  
o If 0 of the others chooses Y, RED will get 30 tokens. 
o If 1 of others chooses Y, RED will get 22 tokens. 
o If 2 of others choose Y, RED will get 14 tokens. 
o If 3 of others choose Y, RED will get 6 tokens. 
o If 4 of others choose Y, RED will lose 2 tokens. 
o If 5 of others choose Y, RED will lose 10 tokens. 
• if RED chooses Y, BLUE earns 15 tokens and RED earns 15 tokens. 
If BLUE chooses option B, the choice made by RED has no consequences on either 
BLUE’s or RED’s earnings:  
• BLUE earns 8 tokens and RED earns 8 tokens. 
We ask you to make a decision first as RED, then as BLUE. We will inform you of 
the role you are actually assigned in this Part only at the end of the session. 
If you are assigned the BLUE role, your earnings from this part will depend on the 
choice you made as BLUE, and on the choice made by your counterpart as RED. 
If you are assigned the RED role, your earnings from this part will depend on the 
choice you made as RED, on the choice made by your counterpart as BLUE, and on 
the choices made as RED by each of the other five members of your group. 
You will be informed of the results of this Part only at the end of the session.  
We will now make an example. At the end of the example we will ask you to answer 
two questions, to verify you understanding of the instructions. Remember that you 
earn €0.40 for each question you answer correctly. 
Look at your screen. You now have to make a choice as RED. Please, choose Y, and 
confirm your choice. Good. You now have to make a choice as BLUE. Please, choose 
B and confirm your choice. Good. On your screen, you will now see two questions. 
Please, give your answers by pressing the corresponding buttons.  
If you are not sure about the answer, you can re-read the instructions. Take your time 
and think carefully before answering the question. 
[As RED, you chose Y and as BLUE you chose B. You are assigned the BLUE role, 
and your counterpart, who is assigned the RED role, chose X. Two of the other 
members of your group chose Y as RED.  
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• How much do you earn? 
• How much does your counterpart earn?] 
We will now make another example. At the end of the example we will ask you to 
answer two questions, to verify you understanding of the instructions. Remember that 
you earn €0.40 for each question you answer correctly. 
Look at your screen. You now have to make a choice as RED. Please, choose X, and 
confirm your choice. Good. You now have to make a choice as BLUE. Please, choose 
A and confirm your choice. Good. On your screen, you will now see two questions. 
Please, give your answers by pressing the corresponding buttons.  
[As RED, you chose X and as BLUE you chose A. You are assigned the RED role, and 
your counterpart, who is assigned the BLUE role, chose A. Four of the other members 
of your group chose Y as RED.  
• How much do you earn? 
• How much does your counterpart earn?] 
You will now read on your screen the last two questions. Please, give your answers by 
pressing the corresponding buttons. 
• Can your counterpart in Part 2 be the same person as in Part 1? 
• How many people are there in each group? 
If you have any doubts on the instructions, please raise your hand now. Good, then we 
can start with Part 2. 
 
Instructions for Part 3 
In this part of the study, participants are in the same groups of six as in Parts 1 and 
2. In each group, three participants will be assigned the role BLUE, while the other 
three will be RED, then the computer will form pairs of subjects belonging to the 
same group. If you are BLUE, you will be paired with a RED player, and vice versa. 
Your counterpart will never know your true identity, nor will you know hers/his. Your 
counterpart will NOT be the same person as in Part 1 or in Part 2. 
In Part 3, you will be asked to take 3 decisions. First you will have vote in favor of 
either Situation 1, or Situation 2. Then you will have to make a choice as RED and as 
BLUE, as in Parts 1 and 2. 
Situation 1 is the situation you faced in Part 1 of this study, represented in Table 3. 
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Table	  3:	  Situation1	  
BLUE chooses RED chooses Earnings 
A 
X 
BLUE: 0 
RED: 30 
Y 
BLUE: 15 
RED: 15 
B Irrelevant 
BLUE: 8 
RED: 8 
 
Situation 2 is the situation you faced in Part 2 of this study, represented in Table 4. 
Table	  4:	  Situation	  2	  
BLUE chooses RED chooses Earnings 
A 
X 
BLUE: 0 
RED: 30 – 8 x number of others who choose Y 
Y 
BLUE: 15 
RED: 15 
B Irrelevant 
BLUE: 8 
RED: 8 
When all participants have casted their vote, you will be informed of how many of 
your group’s members voted for Situation 1, of how many of your group’s members 
voted for Situation 2, and of the outcome of the vote. 
If the majority of the members of your group vote for Situation 1, then the rules for 
the rest of this Part will be the same as in Part 1. If instead the majority of the 
members in your group vote for Situation 2, then the rules for the rest of this Part will 
be the same as in Part 2. If in your group three members vote in favor of Situation 1, 
and three members vote in favor of Situation 2, then the outcome will be randomly 
determined by the computer. 
We ask you to make a decision first as RED, then as BLUE. We will inform you of 
the role you are actually assigned only at the end of the session. 
If you are assigned the BLUE role, your earnings from this part will depend on the 
choice you made as BLUE, and on the choice made by your counterpart as RED. 
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If you are assigned the RED role, your earnings from this part will depend on the 
choice you made as RED, and on the choice made by your counterpart as BLUE. In 
case in your group the outcome of the vote is Situation 2, earnings for RED may also 
depend on the choices made as RED by each of the other five members of your group. 
You will be informed of the results of this Part only at the end of the session. 
We will now make an example. At the end of the example we will ask you to answer 
two questions, to verify you understanding of the instructions. Remember that you 
earn €0.40 for each question you answer correctly. 
Look at your screen. You now have to vote either for Situation 1 or for Situation 2. 
Please, vote for Situation 2, and confirm your choice. 
You can now see on your screen that the majority of your group members voted for 
Situation 1. Hence, the rules for the rest of this Part will be the same as in Part 1.  
You now have to make a choice as RED. Please, choose Y, and confirm your choice. 
Good. You now have to make a choice as BLUE. Please, choose B and confirm your 
choice. Good. On your screen, you will now see two questions. Please, give your 
answers by pressing the corresponding buttons.  
If you are not sure about the answer, you can re-read the instructions. Take your time 
and think carefully before answering the question. 
[Situation 1 has been selected. As RED, you chose Y and as BLUE you chose B. You 
are assigned the BLUE role, and your counterpart, who is assigned the RED role, 
chose X. Four of the other members of your group chose Y as RED. 
• How much do you earn? 
• How much does your counterpart earn?] 
We will now make another example. At the end of the example we will ask you to 
answer two questions, to verify you understanding of the instructions. Remember that 
you earn €0.40 for each question you answer correctly. 
Look at your screen. You now have to vote either for Situation 1 or for Situation 2. 
Please, vote for Situation 1, and confirm your choice. 
You can now see on your screen that the majority of your group members voted for 
Situation 2. Hence, the rules for the rest of this Part will be the same as in Part 2.  
You now have to make a choice as RED. Please, choose X, and confirm your choice. 
Good. You now have to make a choice as BLUE. Please, choose A and confirm your 
choice. Good. On your screen, you will now see two questions. Please, give your 
answers by pressing the corresponding buttons.   
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[Situation 2 has been selected. As RED, you chose X and as BLUE you chose A. You 
are assigned the RED role, and your counterpart, who is assigned the BLUE role, 
chose A. Two of the other members of your group chose Y as RED. 
• How much do you earn? 
• How much does your counterpart earn?] 
You will now read on your screen the last two questions. Please, give your answers by 
pressing the corresponding buttons. 
• Can your counterpart in Part 3 be the same person as in Part 1 or Part 2? 
• If four members of your group vote for Situation 1 and two members of your group 
vote for Situation 2, in Part 3 your group will play according to the rules adopted in 
Part 1 of the study. True or False? 
  
If you have any doubts on the instructions, please raise your hand now. Good, then we 
can start with Part 3. 
 
Instructions for Part 4 
In this part of the study, participants are in the same groups of six as in Parts 1, 2 
and 3. In each group, three participants will be assigned the role BLUE, while the 
other three will be RED, then the computer will form pairs of subjects belonging to 
the same group. If you are BLUE, you will be paired with a RED player, and vice 
versa. Your counterpart will never know your true identity, nor will you know 
hers/his. Your counterpart may be the same person as in Part 1, Part 2 or in Part 3. 
Rules for Part 4 are the same as for Part 3: you will be asked to take 3 decisions. First 
you will have vote in favor of either Situation 1, or Situation 2. Then you will have to 
make a choice as RED and as BLUE, as in Parts 1, 2 and 3. Differently from Part 3, 
in Part 4, before making your decisions, you will receive information on the choices 
that you and your group members made in Parts 1, and 2. 
At the end of this Part, you will receive information on the outcome of Parts 1, 2 
3 and 4 of the study. You will know the role you have been assigned in each Part, 
and the earnings you obtained. 
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Appendix 3  
Questionnaire 
We kindly ask you to complete this questionnaire. The answers you give will not 
affect in any way your earnings. Some of these questions refer to personal 
information, which will help us in this study. Your identity will not be revealed under 
any circumstances in the presentation of the results.  
Please answer carefully. Once an answer is given, you can no longer change it.  
Press OK to begin. Thank you.  
1. Were the instructions you have received for today's activities clear? 
(1) No, not at all (2) No, not so much (3) Yes, enough (4) Yes, very much 
2. Gender (press the corresponding button)  
(1) Male (2) Female 
3. Age (please, give your answer using the slider below and press ok to confirm) 
4. Were you born in Italy? 
(1) Yes   (2) No 
5. Education background 
(1) Middle high school (2) High school    (3) Bachelor degree 
(4) Master degree  (5) Ph.D. or postgraduate degree (6) Other 
6. Occupation 
(1) Student  (2) Self-employed worker (3) Employee  (4) Retired 
(5) Jobless  (6) Others 
6.1 Field of studies (this question is accessed only if the subject gives answer (1) to 
question 6) 
(1) Social sciences   (2) Mathematical, Physical and Natural sciences  
(3) Engineering and Architecture (4) Medicine 
(5) Literature and Philosophy  (6) Others 
7. Have you attended courses in Economics? 
(1) Yes   (2) No 
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8. Have you attended courses in Statistics? 
(1) Yes   (2) No 
9. Have you attended courses in Game Theory? 
(1) Yes   (2) No 
10. Have you previously participated as a volunteer in other researches?  
(choose one or more answers) 
(1) Yes, in the field of economics 
(2) Yes, in the field of psychology 
(3) Yes, in the field of medicine or biology 
(4) No 
11. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you 
can’t be too careful in dealing with people? 
(1) Most people can be trusted (2) Can’t be too careful (3) No idea 
12. Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to 
avoid taking risk? 
Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means: “unwilling to take risks” and 
the value 10 means: “fully prepared to take risk” 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
13. In general, do you think it is important to help others, and take care of their well 
being?  
Please tick a box on the scale, where the value 1 means: “not important at all” and the 
value 10 means: “Maximally important” 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 
14. Which of these diagrams represents the relationship between Orange-Citrus 
Fruit-Fruit? Please select an answer and click OK to confirm. 
 
15.  Select the element that completes the following series.  
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Please select an answer and click OK to confirm. 
 
16. A bat and a ball cost $ 1.10 in total. The bat costs $ 1.00 more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost? 
17. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 
machines to make 100 widgets? 
18. In a pond, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it 
takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire pond, how long would it take for the 
patch to cover half of the pond? 
 
